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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
C&Y CORP,, a Utah corporation,:
ROBERT A. CONDIE, an
:
individual, and JAMES YARTER, :
an individual,
;
Plaintiff/Appellants.

:

VS.

J

GENERAL BIOMETRICS, INC., a
Delaware corporation;
VENTANA GROWTH FUND, a
California limited partnership, and THOMAS GEPHART,
an individual,

::
::
J
:
:
:

Defendant/Appellees.

Court of Appeals
No. 940340-CA

:

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
The Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k) (Supp. 1993).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the trial court err

in issuing

findings of fact and conclusions of law?

inconsistent

Questions of law are

reviewed for correctness without any special deference to the
trial court. Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1. v.
Felan, 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987).
2.

Did the trial court err in finding that the plaintiffs

offer of $400,000 down and $100,000 in 120 days was not a "cash
1

offer?"

Findings of fact are clearly erroneous if they are

without adequate evidentiary foundation or if they are induced by
an erroneous view of the law.

Western Capital & Sec. . Inc. v.

Knudsvia, 768 P.2d 989 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 779 P.2d
688 (Utah 1989).
3.

Did the trial court err in determining that the subject

contract between C&Y Corporation, Robert A. Condie and James
Yarter ( hereinafter collectively referred to as "C&Y Corporation") and Defendant General Biometrics, Inc. ("GenBio") for the
purchase and sale of the MRC Division was not within the scope of
the GenBio Board of Directors prior approval of the sale of the
MRC Division?

Questions of law are reviewed for correctness

without any special deference to the trial court.

Western Kane

County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v. Felan, 744 P. 2d 1376 (Utah
1987).
4.

Did the trial court err in determining that Mr. Gephart

did not have the apparent authority to enter into a contract with
the Plaintiffs for the purchase and sale of the MRC Division?
Questions of law are reviewed for correctness without any special
deference to the trial court. Western Kane County Special Serv.
Dist. No. 1 v. Felan. 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987).
5.

Did the trial court err in determining that there was

no contract for the purchase and sale of the MRC Division between
C&Y Corporation and Defendant GenBio?

Questions of law are

reviewed for correctness without any special deference to the
trial court.

Western Kane County Special Serv. Dist. No. 1 v.
2

Felan. 744 P.2d 1376 (Utah 1987).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case arises out of a complaint filed by C&Y Corporation
against GenBio, Ventana Growth Fund

("Ventana") and Thomas

Gephart for breach of an agreement for the purchase and sale of
GenBio7s MRC Division, unjust enrichment, disregard of corporate
entity and negligent misrepresentation. (R. 1-47).

Defendants

GenBio and Ventana counterclaimed against Plaintiffs alleging
causes of action for breach of fiduciary duty and misappropriation of corporate opportunity. (R. 54-70). GenBio filed a motion
for summary judgment asserting that as a matter of law no
contract existed between the parties for the purchase and sale of
the MRC Division. (R. 124-25).

C&Y Corporation filed a cross-

motion for summary judgment that a binding contract did exist as
a matter of law. Both motions were denied by the trial court.
(R.713-14).

Approximately one week prior to the beginning of

trial, this case was transferred from Judge Rodney Page to Judge
Jon Memmott.
Thereafter, this matter was brought to trial before the
court, sitting without a jury, and the trial court granted
Defendants' Rule 41, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, motion
against C&Y Corporation on all causes of action in the Complaint,
with the exception of the negligent misrepresentation claim
against Thomas Gephart. The Court subsequently ruled in favor of
Mr. Gephart, finding that Mr. Gephart had not negligently
3

misrepresented a presently existing material fact. In addition,
the Court found in favor of Mr. Condie cmd Mr. Yarter on all
causes of action set forth in the Defendants' Counterclaim,
ruling that neither Mr. Condie nor Mr. Yarter breached any
fiduciary duties they may have owed to GenBio or misappropriated
any corporate opportunity.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
GenBio was formed on April 20, 1987 by merging Microbiological Research Corporation with Datagene, Inc. Microbiological
Research Corporation was an independent company
Bountiful, Utah.

located in

From its beginning, GenBio has been dominated

and controlled by Defendant Ventana, and its general partners,
Thomas Gephart and Duwaine Townsen. (R. 1593). Ventana has been
able to dominate

and control

GenBio

because

of Ventana's

ownership of the single largest block of voting stock (R.1585,
1592) and control over other voting stock, which gives Ventana
control of a super-majority of the stock of GenBio, and because
of the amount of loans made to GenBio.

Over the history of

GenBio, Ventana has kept GenBio solvent by loaning it millions of
dollars, for which warrants were issued. (R. 1587). Without the
constant influx of loans from Ventana, GenBio would have ceased
to exist long ago.

GenBio would not have been able to meet its

payroll, pay suppliers, or continue its research in the Immunodot
project.

GenBio is a research and development company whose

future success or failure is dependent entirely on the Immunodot
4

project.
In addition, Ventana has controlled the board of directors
of GenBio by appointing or removing directors at its discretion.
Ventana also has prevented all shareholders meetings and has not
allowed any information to be sent to the shareholders, including
financial information.

(R. 1592).

Not a single director of

GenBio ever has been elected by the shareholders. (R. 1592-93).
However, the bylaws of GenBio require annual shareholder meetings
and that directors be elected by the shareholders.
Because of Ventana's control and the enormous amounts of
loans made to GenBio, Ventana, through its managing partners
Gephart and Townsen, has treated GenBio as its own. Not a single
action of any significance has been taken without the approval of
Gephart or Townsen and many actions were taken at the insistence
of these two persons without board approval.

For example,

when

a dispute arose between the officers, it was not the GenBio Board
of Directors which resolved the dispute, but Gephart. (R.1593).
A dispute arose between Norm Monson, who was the president of the
company, and Mr. Yarter, who was a director of GenBio at that
time.

(R.1593).

It was

Gephart

terminate Monson. (R. 1593).

who

made

the

decision

to

In addition, it was Gephart who

made the decision to hire John Gordy as president of GenBio, not
the Board of Directors. (R.1593).

Gephart was neither an officer

or director of GenBio when he made these decisions.

Control of

the decisions to hire and fire key officers is but one example of
the way Gephart treated GenBio and how he considered GenBio to be

5

his own.
In mid-1989, Ventana decided to sell the MRC Division of
GenBio located in Bountiful, Utah. At this time, GenBio took the
necessary steps to separate the MRC Division from the rest of
GenBio.

Separate financial statements were kept for the MRC

Division and the MRC Division became a stand-alone division. The
purpose of breaking out MRC was to facilitate it's sale. During
the November 30, 1989 board meeting of GenBio, the board of
directors pre-approved the sale of the MRC Division for $500,000.
(R. 1595). The GenBio board of directors also approved a commission schedule for John Gordy, GenBio's president, relating to the
proposed sale. (R. 1595). If the MRC Division sold for $500,000,
Gordy was to receive a 5% commission, up to a maximum of $50,000.
(R.1595).
For

approximately

the

next

year,

GenBio

aggressively

attempted to sell its MRC Division, but with no success. Of the
numerous entities contacted, only six companies showed even a
slight interest or gave any response.

Of these six companies,

not one of them made an offer which was acceptable to GenBio.
Even one company, Gull Laboratories, Inc. of Salt Lake City,
Utah, refused to make any offer to purchase the MRC Division
because it did not feel that MRC was worth buying at almost any
price.

In May 1990, after more than six months of MRC being on

the sale block, Yarter mentioned in passing to Condie that he
might be interested in purchasing the MRC Division.

Condie and

Yarter had no further discussions concerning their purchase of
6

the MRC Division until the end of 1990, and conceived of no plan
to purchase the MRC Division until that time.

As a matter of

fact, in the November to December 1990 time frame, Mr. Yarter
introduced Dr. Preston Dorsett of Viral Antigens to Townsen.
(R.1594).

Mr. Yarter was aware that Dr. Dorsett might be

interested in purchasing the MRC Division and put Dr. Dorsett in
touch with Townsen so they could discuss the possibility of Dr.
Dorsett purchasing MRC. (R.1594).
On December 13, 1990, Condie sent to Townsen an offer to
purchase the MRC Division for $400,000.

On December 16, 1990,

Gephart called Mr. Condie at his home and told him that he was
now chairman of GenBio and that Townsen was resigning because he
was "burned out." However, Gephart at that time had been neither
a director nor officer of GenBio and was not elected to the
position of chairman by the shareholders. Gephart merely assumed
the position consistent with his past control of GenBio.

During

the conversation between Gephart and Condie, Gephart reminded
Condie that he controlled GenBio and that Condie knew that GenBio
did whatever Ventana wanted. (Trial Transcript, Vol. II, p.100)
Gephart reaffirmed his interest in selling the MRC Division and
requested that all further communications be directed to him.
On or about December 23, 1990, Condie called Gephart and
made a new offer for the purchase of the MRC Division of $350,000
down and $100,000 in six months.

Gephart counter-offered with a

sale price of $500,000, with $400,000 down and $100,000 within
120 days. (R. 1586).

Condie responded that he would consider the

7

offer and get back to Gephart with his response.
On January

7, 1991, Condie sent a letter

to Gephart

accepting the $500,000 cash offer (attached hereto as Exhibit
"A"). On January 9, 1991, Condie called Gephart to ensure he had
received the letter. Gephart confirmed that he had received the
acceptance letter, but pointed out an error in addition in
Condie's letter. Gephart also requested that Condie do the legal
work in order to speed up the closing. Gephart followed up this
conversation with a letter dated January 10, 1991 to Condie again
confirming their agreement for the purchase and sale of the MRC
Division for $500,000 and noting the error in addition in
Condie's January 7th letter (attached hereto as Exhibit "B").
Shortly

after this conversation,

Condie

called Harvey

Flodin, general counsel of both Ventana and GenBio, to arrange
formalization of the purchase and sale of the MRC Division.
Flodin told Condie that he had heard about the deal, but did not
know the specifics.

Flodin requested Condie to send to him the

letters confirming the deal.
Over the next several weeks, Condie, Rand Elison, counsel
for C&Y Corporation, and Flodin endeavored to draft the final
agreement.

This included three drafts of an agreement and

discussion of ancillary items. Elison prepared the first draft
as a stock purchase due to a misunderstanding. On March 4, 1991,
Elison sent to Flodin a final draft of the agreement, the third
draft, and a demand for closing.

On March 5, 1991, Elison

received a letter from Flodin stating that the GenBio board of
8

directors would be meeting on March 5, 1991 and that the closing
should occur on March 18, 1991. On March 7, 1991, Gephart called
Condie at his home and told him that he had to go to Sweden to
get approval from Swedish investors prior to closing.

Gephart

stated that lack of approval from the Swedes could "kill the
deal." Gephart then told Condie that he would get back to him at
the end of March, after his return.
After this call with Gephart, Condie called Flodin and was
told by Flodin that he was "getting screwed."

Flodin also told

Condie that he shouldn't talk to him anymore about the deal. On
March 8, 1991, Condie sent a letter to Gephart and Townsen
stating that he was prepared to close the deal on March 18, 1991.
Elison also talked to Flodin and Yarter spoke to Townsen.

On

March 18, 1991, Condie and Yarter were ready, willing and able to
close the deal, with money in hand.
showed.

But no one from GenBio

Subsequent to this, Condie received a letter from

Gephart stating that the GenBio board of directors had decided
not to sell the MRC Division and that the deal had always been
subject to board approval.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court's finding that the offer made by C&Y
Corporation did not fall within the GenBio Board's prior approval
because it was not a "cash offer" is clearly erroneous and
completely unsupported by the evidence admitted at trial.

The

only evidence admitted at trial was that C&Y Corporation's offer
9

of $500,000, with $400,000 down at closing and the remaining
$100,000 to be paid within 120 days, constituted a "cash offer."
Because the court's finding is completely unsupported by the
evidence and against the clear weight of authority, this Court
must set aside the trial court's finding that the agreement
struck between the parties was not a "cash offer" and enter a
finding consistent with the evidence, that C&Y Corporation's
offer was a "cash offer."
The trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling that
Gephart did not have authority to consummate a contract with C&Y
Corporation for the purchase and sale of the MRC Division.
Gephart either had actual authority to enter the subject contract
because of the GenBio Board's prior approval, or had the apparent
authority to bind GenBio to the purchase and sale of its MRC
Division to C&Y Corporation.

As the trial court specifically

found, the GenBio board of directors expressly pre-approved the
sale of the MRC Division for $500,000.

Because the agreement

between C&Y Corporation and GenBio for the purchase and sale of
the MRC Division was for $500,000, no further board approval was
required.
Regardless of whether Gephart had actual authority, Gephart
was clothed with apparent authority in this transaction to bind
GenBio to a contract for the purchase and sale of the MRC
Division, under any terms.

A long-standing, well recognized

exception to the requirement of board approval is the doctrine of
apparent authority. Under this exception, board approval is not
10

required to consummate

a transaction of a party purportedly

acting on behalf of the corporation when the person is clothed
with

apparent

authority.

Under

the

doctrine

of

apparent

authority, liability is premised upon the corporations knowledge
of or acquiescence in the conduct of its agent which has caused
third

parties

to

rely

upon

the

agent's

actions.

In

this

instance, GenBio allowed Gephart to take took control of GenBio
and run the company as if it was his own. Moreover, not only did
GenBio completely acquiesce in Gephart's control, GenBio invited
it.

This is a textbook example of apparent authority.

Accord-

ingly, this Court should reverse the trial court's conclusion of
law that Mr. Gephart did not have apparent authority to bind
GenBio to the subject contract and enter its own ruling that
Gephart did have the apparent authority to bind GenBio to the
purchase and sale of the MRC division.
This Court also should reverse the trial court and hold that
the

agreement

reached

between

the

parties

definite to constitute a binding contract.

was

sufficiently

As a matter of law,

the trial court erred in ruling that the agreement between the
parties for the purchase and sale of the MRC Division was not
sufficiently definite to constitute a contract. The agreement of
the parties in this case is confirmed in writing, setting forth
its terms and provisions. That writing, which speaks for itself,
is controlling, eliminating any factual issues with respect to
the express, unambiguous, terms and provisions thereof.

It sets

forth the essential terms of the agreement of the parties: the

11

sale of the assets and liabilities of the MRC Division of GenBio
for $500,000. The price is established.
established.

The payment terms are

The subject of the sale is established as the

assets and liabilities of the MRC Division of GenBio.
agreement

between

the parties

is sufficiently

The

definite to

constitute a binding contract.
The Judgment in this case should be set aside by this Court
and the case remanded for a new trial because the findings of
fact entered by the trial court are completely inconsistent and
cannot support the judgment. In ruling on Plaintiff's Complaint,
and entering the findings of fact, the court found that Gephart
did not exercise control over GenBio and, thus, did not have
apparent authority to bind GenBio to the purchase and sale of the
MRC Division.

But in entering the findings of fact on Defend-

ants7 Counterclaim, the court made a multitude of findings that
Mr. Gephart controlled GenBio, treated GenBio as his own company
and that GenBio acquiesced in and invited Gephart's conduct.
Because the findings of fact entered by the trial court are so
inconsistent that it is not possible to determine what facts the
court intended to find, the findings of fact cannot support the
judgment and this Court must remand this case for a new trial
unless the Court reverses the trial court's finding of no
apparent authority

and enters its own finding of apparent

authority.

12

ARGUMENT
I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE OFFER
IN THIS CASE WAS NOT A "CASH OFFER."
The trial court's finding that the agreement struck between
the parties did not fall within the GenBio Board's prior approval
because it was not a "cash offer" is clearly erroneous and
completely unsupported

by the evidence

admitted

at trial.

Accordingly, this Coxirt should set aside the trial court's
erroneous finding and enter a finding consistent with the
evidence, that C&Y Corporation's offer was a "cash offer."
If the trial court had not abused its discretion in making
this erroneous finding, then the trial court would have concluded
that the subject contract fell within the prior approval of the
GenBio Board of Directors for the sale of the MRC Division. The
trial court specifically found that on November 30, 1989, the
GenBio Board of directors pre-approved the sale of the MRC
Division for $500,000.
2.
At GenBio's Board of Directors Meeting
("Board Meeting") held November 30, 1989,
the Board authorized Mr. John T. Gordy to
investigate the possible sale of MRC. The
Court found the Board of Directors authorized Mr. Gordy to sell MRC Division for
5500,000 or more in a cash sale. For any
sale less than $500,000 cash, Mr. Gordy was
instructed to bring those offers to the
Board for Further discussion and decision.
Ruling on Proposed Findings and Objections, f 2 (R. 1585)
(emphasis added).

However, the trial court found that because

this was not a "cash offer," it did not fall within the prior
13

approval.

(R. 1586).

The reason GenBio required a cash sale was so that it could
have the needed capital to conduct further research and development of its ImmunoDot project.

GenBio was not interested in

having another company acquire the MRC Division by trading some
of that company's stock or other assets. What GenBio wanted was
cash to fuel the ImmunoDot research. As explained by Mr. Yarter:
Q
(By Mr. Moxley):
What was your
knowledge of the interest of the Board of
Directors in selling MRC and putting it for
sale during 1989-1990?
A
[By Mr. Yarter]
Well,
the
Board was looking at it from the point of
view that they needed to generate some more
cash to support the I-Dot which was the
future of the business. And Mr. Gordy had
presented this as an avenue to generate more
cash.
Trial Transcript, Vol. I, p. 206.

Without the influx of cash,

there was no reason to sell the MRC Division.

That is why an

offer to sell MRC in exchange for stock was rejected.
But the trial court found that the contract entered between
the parties was not a cash offer because only $400,000 was to be
paid upon closing, and the remainder of the purchase price would
be paid by C&Y corporation paying $75,000 within 90 days after
closing, and $25,000 to be paid 120 days after closing. This was
the counter-offer made by Gephart and which C&Y Corporation
accepted. However, the fact that $100,000 would be held back to
ensure performance does not alter the nature of the transaction
and is inconsistent with the testimony that this constituted a
"cash offer" as desired by the GenBio Board. This did not in any
14
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would consider that, as I saiid Tsic] to Mr.
Quinn, a cash offer.
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Indeed, the trial court's finding is made out of whole cloth. It
has no basis in fact or reality. Accordingly, because the trial
court's finding that this is not a cash offer is clearly
erroneous, it must be set aside by this Court and a finding
entered that the $500,000 offer, with $400,000 down and $100,000
within 120 days, was a "cash offer" and fell within the GenBio
Board's prior approval.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
HOLDING THAT THOMAS GEPHART DID NOT HAVE THE
AUTHORITY TO ENTER THE SUBJECT CONTRACT.
The trial court erred as a matter of law in ruling that
Gephart did not have authority to consummate a contract with C&Y
Corporation for the purchase and sale of the MRC Division.
Because of the trial court's error, this Court should reverse the
trial court and hold that Gephart had either actual authority or
apparent authority to bind GenBio to the purchase and sale of its
MRC Division to C&Y Corporation. As the trial court specifically
found, the GenBio board of directors expressly pre-approved the
sale of the MRC Division for $500,000.

Because the agreement

between C&Y Corporation and GenBio for the purchase and sale of
the MRC Division was for $500,000, no further board approval was
required.

However, the trial court erroneously found that C&Y

Corporation's offer did not fall within the pre-approved sale
because it was not a "cash offer." But as set forth in the
preceding section, the trial court's finding that it was not a
cash offer is clearly erroneous and unsupported by the evidence.
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1983), the Utah Supreme Court stated:
Apparent authority exists; "where a person
has created such an appearance of things
that it causes a third party reasonably and
prudently to believe that the second party
v
has the power *- a <
~- ~*lf of the first
person
, . • •
Id. at 75 (quoting Wynn v. racnanon r. :... .
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1090 (Utah 1988).

In Zions, the Utah Supreme Court stated that:

"Where corporate liability is sought for
acts of its agents under apparent authority,
liability is premised upon the corporation's
knowledge of or acquiescence in the conduct
of its agent which has caused third parties
to rely upon the agent's actions."
Id. at 1095.

(quoting City Electric v. Dean Evans Chrysler-

Plymouth, 672 P.2d 89, 90 (Utah 1983)).
In analyzing the apparent authority of Gephart, it is
important to understand the relationship of GenBio in the context
of Gephart and his venture capital firm, Ventana.
managing partner of Ventana.

Gephart was

Ventana is the largest single

shareholder of GenBio voting stock and funds GenBio's existence
with venture capital.

GenBio is a hostage, an alter ego of

Gephart and his venture capital firm.

It is totally dependent

upon them for operating funds. Without those funds, GenBio would
be insolvent.

Its revenues do not begin to cover its expenses.

GenBio depends upon Gephart7s funding to make payroll, pay debt
service, fund R&D, support plant and equipment, and to support
every other aspect of its corporate existence. Absent Gephart7s
funding, GenBio could not survive financially.
In addition to controlling the purse strings of GenBio,
Gephart controls the company from an ownership standpoint.

He

controls the largest single block of voting stock, nearly 24%.
In addition, the limited partners of Ventana, which is Gephart7s
venture capital firm, own an additional 40% to 50% of GenBio7s
voting stock.

That super-majority enables him to appoint every

director, override any decision or action by the board of
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directors, and discharge any

director at his whim.
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3.
The history of the operations of GenBio
are that there was very little consideration
of shareholders' interests in the operation
of GenBio and that GenBio was not run in the
manner consistent for providing shareholder
information.
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ever

happi 'in

conducted

the

any shareholders' meetings and there have
been no election of directors by the shareholders in the history of the corporation.
5.
Mr, Gephart and Mr. Townsen exercised a
great deal of control over the GenBio board
of directors in the operation of GenBio,
however, this influence did not rise to the
level of being a violation of law.
6.
With the exception of Mr. Condie, all
of the GenBio directors were either employees of Ventana, consultants who had a
relationship with Ventana, shareholders with
another portfolio company of Ventana, or
GenBio employees. The appointment of all
directors were at the direction of Mr.
Gephart or Mr. Townsen. Mr. Gephart or Mr.
Townsen controlled who subsequent directors
would be and controlled the appointment of
the directors in this case.
7.
Many of the decisions to hire key
personnel, rather them being made by the
GenBio board of directors independently,
were made either by Mr. Gephart or Mr.
Townsen. Mr. Gordv, who was hired as president, was instructed to talk to Mr. Gephart
and Mr. Townsen rather than deal with Mr.
Monson, who was the CEO of GenBio. At this
time, Mr. Gephart was neither a director nor
an officer of GenBio.
8.
When there was a dispute between the
officers, it was Mr. Gephart who was involved in the resolution of the dispute, not
the board of directors. This included a
dispute between Mr. Yarter and Mr. Monson,
which resulted in the decision to terminate
Mr. Monson. This decision was made by Mr.
Gephart and not the board of directors.
9.
In considering the evidenced adduced on
whether Mr. Gephart or the board made this
decision, and the testimony of Mr. Gephart
and what has happened in GenBio in general,
the Court has serious reservations on the
credibility of Mr. Gephart's testimony. Mr.
Gephart had substantial influence in the
operation of GenBio, but has little, if no,
recollection on what has occurred.
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iu, Mr. Gephart and Mi : -- -«^n * J 7 a great.
deal of control in t*> i- SJLJI* when to
recall loans and the ii«, of payments,
rather than the GenBio board of directors,
or independent officers, being able to
control when money was sent. The decisions
to recall loans and the timing of payments
were made in the best interest of Ventana,
rather than the best interest of GenBio*

23. During *-*-- ">er 30, 1989 board
meeting, the u^directors gave Mr.
Gordy approval t
MRC for $500,000 or
more and that Mr Gordy would receive a 5%
commission for the sale of the MRC Division.
Mr. Gephart and Mr. Townsen also gave their
approval to sell the MRC Division prior to
the November 30, 1989 meeting.

28. Although Mr
Gephart did nut have
actual authority to sell MRC, he had substantial knowledge of GenBio and the MRC
Division and was involved in negotiations to
sell the MRC Division, even though he was
not a member of the GenBio board.
29. Other efforts to sell the MRC Division
include negotiations with Dr. Dorsett. Dr.
Dorsett initially contacted Mr. Townsen. but
Mr. Townsen referred him to Mr. Gephart.

34. - HRC Division clearlj was for sale
beginning in November of 1989. Prior approval of that sale also had been obtained
from both Mr. Gephart and Mr. Townsen prior
to it going to the board of directors for
approval.
Ruling :r Proposed Findings and Objections, ff **-_

exercise c::r

per at ions- JI Genrno were a
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Gephart was not an officer or director of GenBio.

Moreover,

Gephart negotiated the purchase and sale of the MRC Division, and
accepted C&Y Corporation's offer, while he was not an officer or
director of GenBio. When Condie contacted Townsen, who was the
only possible remaining director of GenBio, to make an offer to
purchase the MRC Division, Condie was instructed to direct all
further discussions to Gephart.
director of GenBio at this time.

Again, Gephart was not a
Mr. Condie testified at

follows:
A [By Mr. Condie]
About two weeks
after this letter, I believe the 22nd of
December, it was a Sunday, Mr. Gephart
called me at my home Sunday afternoon.
Q
And what did he say to you and
what was your response?
A
He told me that he was now in
charge of [GenBio]. Mr. Townsen was burned
out. That he was going to reorganize the
board. And if I had any further interest in
pursuing the purchase of MRC, that he's the
one that I should contact.
Trial Transcript, Vol. II, p. 100.
In addition, when Dr. Preston Dorsett, who is the only
completely non-interested witness to testify at trial, contacted
GenBio to inquire about purchasing the MRC Division, Dr. Dorsett
was instructed to direct all communications to Gephart, who was
not a director of GenBio at this time. Dr. Dorsett testified as
follows:
A [By Dr. Dorsett] I was in Memphis,
Tennessee, at our facility. And as I recall, I telephoned and could not contact
[Mr. Townsen] and he returned my call.
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Q
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directly with Mr, Thomas Gephart* That M r ,
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THE TRIAL COURT ERRED 1U RULING THAT AS A
MATTER OF LAW THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PARTIES
W.u NOT SUFFICIENTLY DEFINITE TO CONSTITUTE A CONTRACT.
As a matter of law, the trial court erred in ruling that the
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agreement between the parties for the purchase and sale of the
MRC Division was not sufficiently definite to constitute a
contract.

This Court should reverse the trial court and hold

that the agreement reached between the parties was sufficiently
definite to constitute a binding contract. The agreement of the
parties in this case is confirmed in writing, setting forth its
terms and provisions. That writing, which speaks for itself, is
controlling, eliminating any factual issues with respect to the
express, unambiguous, terms and provisions thereof.

The plain

language of the letter agreement of Gephart slams shut any
further argument.

Gephart unequivocally declared:

Pursuant to your January 7 correspondence
and to our telephone conversation yesterday
afternoon, I would like to provide a written
acknowledgement of the agreement regarding
the sale of assets and liabilities of MRC
from GenBio for 5500,000.
Letter dated January 10, 1991 (emphasis added). (Attached hereto
as Exhibit "B").
itself.

Gephart's January 10, 1991 letter speaks for

It sets forth the essential terms of the agreement of

the parties: the sale of the assets and liabilities of the MRC
Division of GenBio for $500,000. The price is established. The
payment terms are established.

The subject of the sale is

established as the assets and liabilities of the MRC Division of
GenBio.
The test of whether an agreement is sufficiently definite is
whether it provides sufficient information to enable the Court to
determine if a breach has occurred, and if so, to afford an
appropriate remedy.

That test is plainly satisfied as a matter
24
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effect.

Where two constructions are possible, it will be

construed to effectuate a valid contract.
P.2d 1316 (Utah 1976).

Stanal v. Todd, 554

Consistent with these basic policy

considerations, the well-settled law in Utah is that if an
agreement is reached on essential terms, a binding, enforceable
contract is created, despite the existence of ancillary and
incidental matters

that

are not

concluded in the agreement.

specifically

addressed

or

Barker v. Francis. 741 P.2d 548

(Utah Ct. App. 1987); Blachurst v. TransAmerica Ins. Co.. 699
P.2d 688 (Utah 1985).

A contract need not provide for every

collateral matter or possible contingency.

Nixon & Nixon. Inc.

v. John New & Assoc.. Inc.. 641 P.2d 144 (Utah 1982).
In Barker, the Utah Court of Appeals held that a contract is
binding so long as the parties agree to the essential terms.
Barker involved a plaintiff who brought an action for specific
performance of a contract for the sale of land.

The contract

provided that the plaintiff would purchase 40 acres of the
defendants' ranch by paying

$1,000

along with

giving the

defendants 80 acres of the plaintiff's 150 acre farm.

The

contract, however, provided no description of the 80 acres of
farmland that the plaintiff was to convey and the contract
allowed the defendant to choose, at their discretion, what 40
acres the plaintiff would receive. Because the contract did not
include any description of the 80 acres that the plaintiff was to
convey to the defendants, the defendants asserted that the
contract was too indefinite to enforce.
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In holding that the
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accounts receivable, equipment leases, etc. were not addressed or
resolved in the letter.

The court concluded that the agreement

was a binding contract because the parties had agreed to the
essential terms.
In Rand-Whitney, the parties agreed to the purchase and sale
of one of the defendants corporate divisions.

The defendant

subsequently received a more favorable offer for the sale of the
division and refused to close on the transaction, asserting that
there was no contract because the parties had not agreed to the
additional terms. These additional terms, included the buy back
dates for obsolete inventory and uncollectible accounts receivable,

union

contracts,

unbooked

orders

from

suppliers of defendant and equipment leases.

customers

or

The court stated

that these were not essential terms of the agreement to sell the
corporate division of the defendant to the plaintiff.

Because

the parties had agreed to the essential terms of the agreement,
the court found that the agreement was binding.
The case law from the State of Utah, and the other parts of
the country, uniformly holds that the mere fact that the parties
considered the execution of a formal agreement confirming a prior
agreement does not render the prior agreement invalid. Blachurst
v. TransAmerica Ins., Co., 699 P.2d 688 (Utah 1985). The case of
Rand-Whitney also addressed and disposes of that issue.

The

defendants in that case raised the same issue in an effort to
abort the agreement of the parties.

The court pierced through

the letter agreement, holding that the parties' intention to
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execute a formal purchase and sale agreement did not render the
letter agreement invalid.

To the contrary, the parties' intent

to execute a formal purchase and sale agreement demonstrated that
they felt they had an agreement to confirm:
The fact that a further purchase and sale
agreement was contemplated does not defeat
the existence of a contract.

The fact that the contemplated purchase and
sale agreement in this case was expected to
include additional terms, and not just
memorialize terms already addressed and
agreed upon, does not defeat the existence
of a contract where, as here, the parties
already agreed on all of the essential
terms.

In this case I find that contemplation of a
future purchase and sale agreement did not
indicate that the parties believed they were
in a stage of preliminary negotiations.
Rather, the anticipation of a future document indicated, among many other things,
that the parties felt they had an agreement
that had to be formally finalized to be
consummated.
Rand-Whitney. 651 F. Supp. at 535.
When the controlling law is applied to the facts of this
case, the existence of a sufficiently definite agreement is
obvious.

The January 10, 1991 letter confirms the purpose,

subject and essential terms of the agreement of the parties with
more than adequate detail.
assets

and

$500,000.

liabilities

of

The agreement is for the sale of the
the

MRC

Division

of

GenBio

for

Those assets and liabilities, as of January 10, 1991,

are clearly ascertainable.

Separate books and records were kept

on the MRC Division.

Moreover, at the time Defendant GenBio

began its efforts to sell the MRC division, it had documents
prepared that detailed the assets and liabilities thereof, which
GenBio sent to potential purchasers at Gephart's direction so
that the purchasers would know what was for sale.

Those

documents were regularly updated, and copies were given to
Yarter, Condie and Gephart.
The purchase price for the sale of the assets and liabilities is specified, as are the payment terms. The purchase price
is $500,000, with $400,000 to be paid at the time of closing and
installment payments of $75,000 and $25,000 to be paid within 120
days of closing, as agreed by the parties.
The essential terms of this agreement are set forth with at
least as much specificity as in Barker, Blachurst or RandWhitney.

The letters confirming the agreement plainly provide

sufficient information for the parties to understand what their
obligations are, and for the Court to compel a specific performance or fashion an appropriate remedy in the event of a
breach.

Consequently, the agreement satisfies the requirements

of a sufficiently definite contract.

Based on the express

language of the January 10, 1991 letter confirming the agreement
of the parties, it is evident that the trial court erred in
ruling that as matter of law the agreement of the parties was not
sufficiently definite to constitute a contract.

Accordingly,

this Court should reverse the trial court, holding that the
agreement of the parties is sufficiently definite to constitute
30

a contract.
IV.
THE COURT SHOULD SET ASIDE THE JUDGMENT
BECAUSE IT CANNOT BE SUPPORTED BY THE TRIAL COURTS
INCONSISTENT FINDINGS OF FACT.
If the Court does not find that Gephart had the apparent
authority to enter the subject contract, then the Court should
set aside the Judgment and remand the case for a new trial
because the findings of fact entered by the trial court are
completely inconsistent and cannot support the judgment.

In

entering the findings of fact on Plaintiff's Complaint, the court
found that Mr. Gephart did not exercise control over GenBio and,
thus, did not have apparent authority to enter the contract for
the purchase and sale of the MRC Division.

But in entering the

findings of fact on Defendants' Counterclaim, the court made
numerous findings that Mr. Gephart controlled GenBio and treated
it as his own company.

See Ruling on Proposed Findings and

Objections, JI 3-10, 23, 28-29 and 34 (R. 1584-1603).
The major issue raised by Defendants in this case is that
Gephart did not have the authority to bind GenBio to a contract
for the purchase and sale of the MRC Division. The trial court,
however, has entered findings of fact on this very issue which
are so inconsistent with each other that the judgment must fail.
Because it is not possible for this Court to determine what the
trial court intended to find, the findings of fact are insufficient to support the judgment of the trial court and this Court
must remand this case for a new trial.
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In Rucker v. Dalton. 598 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1979), the Utah
Supreme Court stated that
[t]he importance of complete, accurate and
consistent findings of fact in a case tried
by a judge is essential to the resolution of
dispute under the proper rule of law. . . .
Unless findings of fact meet such standards,
application of the proper rule of law is
difficult, if not impossible, and the reviewing function of this Court is seriously
undermined.
Id. at 1338-39 (emphasis added).

See also Woodward v. Fazzio,

823 P.2d 474, 477 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
[W]hen findings of fact by a trial court are
either so inconsistent or so confusing,
vague or indefinite that this Court cannot
determine the facts of the trial court
intended to find, such findings are insufficient to support a judgment.
Hawkins v. Teeoles & Thatcher, Inc.. 515 P.2d 927, 931 (Or. 1973)
(emphasis added).

See also Ierulli v. Lutz Dev. Co. . 698 P.2d

504, 506 (Or. Ct. App. 1985).

In Hawkins, which involved a

breach of contract action, there was a basic inconsistency in the
findings by the trial court in that the trial court found that
the plaintiff had either substantially performed the contract or
had a valid excuse for failing to do so, such as by a wrongful
termination of the contract by defendant. On the other hand, the
trial court entered a finding for defendant on its counterclaim
that there was a material breach of the contract by plaintiffs
and that the defendant had substantially performed the contract.
As the court stated,

lf

[s]uch a finding, however, is completely

inconsistent with the previous finding that defendant violated
the contract by wrongfully terminating it, as necessary to
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support the previous finding of the trial court in favor of
plaintiffs on its complaint."
holding

that

the

Hawkins, 515 P. 2d at 932.

findings were

insufficient

to

support

In
the

judgment, the court further stated:
Because, however, the findings in this case
are so inconsistent and confusing that we
cannot determine what the trial court intended to find, they are insufficient to
support the judgment of the trial court in
this case. It follows that we must either
remand for further findings by the trial
court or remand for a new trial. . . .
In
other cases, however, we have been critical
of that practice and have preferred to
remand cases for a new trial.
Id.

If the court cannot reconcile the inconsistent findings of

fact, the court must then remand the case to the trial court for
a new trial. Paul v. Kuntz, 524 N.E.2d 1326, 1329 (Ind. Ct. App.
1988).
In the present case, this Court cannot reconcile the trial
court's inconsistent findings of fact.

On the one hand, the

court found no facts which evidenced Gephart's control over
GenBio and his apparent authority to enter the subject contract.
Based on these lack of findings, the court entered judgment
against C&Y corporation on its complaint.

On the other hand, in

denying the Defendants' Counterclaim, the court found numerous
instances in which Gephart exercised considerable control over
GenBio and which plainly evidence Gephart's apparent authority,
and in which GenBio acquiesced and invited.

The court found as

follows:
3.
The history of the operations of GenBio
are that there was very little consideration
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of shareholders' interests in the operation
of GenBio and that GenBio was not run in the
manner consistent for providing shareholder
information.
4.
At no time has GenBio ever conducted
any shareholders' meetings and there have
been no election of directors by the shareholders in the history of the corporation,
5.
Mr. Gephart and Mr. Townsen exercised a
great deal of control over the GenBio board
of directors in the operation of GenBio,
however, this influence did not rise to the
level of being a violation of law.
6.
With the exception of Mr. Condie, all
of the GenBio directors were either employees of Ventana, consultants who had a
relationship with Ventana, shareholders with
another portfolio company of Ventana, or
GenBio employees. The appointment of all
directors were at the direction of Mr.
Gephart or Mr. Townsen. Mr. Gephart or Mr.
Townsen controlled who subsequent directors
would be and controlled the appointment of
the directors in this case.
7.
Many of the decisions to hire key
personnel, rather than being made by the
GenBio board of directors independently,
were made either by Mr. Gephart or Mr.
Townsen. Mr. Gordy. who was hired as president, was instructed to talk to Mr. Gephart
and Mr. Townsen rather than deal with Mr.
Monson. who was the CEO of GenBio. At this
time. Mr. Gephart was neither a director nor
an officer of GenBio.
8.
When there was a dispute between the
officers, it was Mr. Gephart who was involved in the resolution of the dispute, not
the board of directors. This included a
dispute between Mr. Yarter and Mr. Monson,
which resulted in the decision to terminate
Mr. Monson. This decision was made by Mr.
Gephart and not the board of directors.
9.
In considering the evidence adduced on
whether Mr. Gephart or the board made this
decision, and the testimony of Mr. Gephart
and what has happened in GenBio in general.
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the Court has serious reservations on
credibility of Mr, Gephart's testimony,
Gephart had substantial influence in
operation of GenBio, but has little, if
recollection on what has occurred.

the
Mr,
the
no,

10. Mr. Gephart and Mr. Townsen had a great
deal of control in the decision when to
recall loans and the time of payments,
rather than the GenBio board of directors,
or independent officers, being able to
control when money was sent. The decisions
to recall loans and the timing of payments
were made in the best interest of Ventana.
rather than the best interest of GenBio.

23. During the November 30, 1989 board
meeting, the board of directors gave Mr.
Gordy approval to sell MRC for $500,000 or
more and that Mr. Gordy would receive a 5%
commission for the sale of the MRC Division.
Mr. Gephart and Mr, Townsen also gave their
approval to sell the MRC Division prior to
the November 30, 1989 meeting.

28. Although Mr. Gephart did not have
actual authority to sell MRC, he had substantial knowledge of GenBio and the MRC
Division and was involved in negotiations to
sell the MRC Division, even though he was
not a member of the GenBio board.
29. Other efforts to sell the MRC Division
include negotiations with Dr. Dorsett. Dr.
Dorsett initially contacted Mr. Townsen. but
Mr. Townsen referred him to Mr. Gephart.

34. The MRC Division clearly was for sale
beginning in November of 1989. Prior approval of that sale also had been obtained
from both Mr. Gephart and Mr, Townsen prior
to it going to the board of directors for
approval,
Ruling on Proposed Findings and Objections, ff 3-10, 23, 28-29,
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34 (R. 1592-97) (emphasis added).
The clear weight of the evidence admitted at trial was that
in all instances in which persons were interested in purchasing
the MRC Division, GenBio instructed all of those persons to deal
with Gephart. But Gephart was neither a director nor an officer
of GenBio during any of these discussions.

Because of the

control which Gephart exercised over GenBio, both through funding
and a control of the voting stock, GenBio not only acquiesced in
Gephart's control, but invited it.
These express factual findings of control plainly are
inconsistent with the court's finding that Mr. Gephart did not
have apparent authority to bind GenBio for the purchase and sale
of the MRC Division. Because the findings of fact entered by the
trial court are so inconsistent, it is not possible to determine
what facts the court intended to find and the findings of fact
cannot support the judgment.

Accordingly, unless the Court

reverses the trial court's finding of no apparent authority and
enters its own finding of apparent authority, this Court must
remand this case for a new trial.
CONCLDSION
For the reasons stated in Points I, II, III and IV above,
plaintiffs/appellants respectfully request that this Court:
1.

Set aside the trial court's clearly erroneous finding

that C&Y Corporation's offer of $500,000 to purchase the MRC
Division, with $400,000 down and the remainder within 120 days,
did not constitute a cash offer, and enter its own finding that
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C&Y Corporation's offer was a cash offer;
2.

Reverse the trial court's determination that Gephart

did not have the apparent authority to enter the subject
contract, and direct the trial court to enter its conclusion of
law that Gephart did have the apparent authority to bind GenBio
to the subject contract for the purchase and sale of the MRC
Division; and
3.

Reverse the trial court's determination

that the

agreement between the parties was not sufficiently definite to
constitute a contract, and direct the trial court to enter its
conclusion of law that the parties had agreed to the essential
terms and that the agreeement was sufficiently definite to
constitute a contract.
4.

Set aside the trial court's judgment and remand the

case for a new trial if the Court does not find that Gephart had
the apparent authority to enter the subject contract;
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 14th day of June 1994.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that on the 14th day of June 1994, two
true and correct copies of the foregoing APPELLANTS' BRIEF were
sent first class United States Mail, postage prepaid, to each of
the following:
Mary Anne Q. Wood, Esq.
Anthony B. Quinn, Esq.
WOOD SPENDLOVE & QUINN
60 East South Temple, #500
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Paul M. Durham, Esq.
DURHAM EVANS & JONES
50 South Main Street, #850
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Dated this

day of June,
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Tab A

BRIGHTON

HOSPITALITY

GROUP

January 7 t 1991

Thomas Gebhart
Ventana Growth Fund
Oear Thomas,
Our group has authorized me to accept your offer to sale to us the assets
of HRC from GenBio for S500•000.00. Our purchase will be as follows:
A. Purchase price

S 500,000.00

B. Cash • Upon closing

$-3i&T«^00 iOPprC

C. *f& days after closing

$ 7Sf0C0.00

D. 120 days after closing

S 25,000.00

It is necessary to have written acknowledgement of our agreement by
Friday, January llth. 'Joon receipt of this acknowledgement, I will have our
attorneys draw uo a written contract of purchase,
n

Yours truly,

Rbbert A. Condie
RAC/km

130 Sou* 400 East. Suae 116
Sa*Ufc£Gnr.Uaft M i l l
nioaeiJOhS2M350
Fax HOUitJ-tSSS

TabB

Via Facsimile: (SOI) 363-1588

D
vervcns

January 10f 1991
Mr. Robert Condie
BRIGHTON HOSPTTALITY GROUP
50 South 400 East
Suite 116
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Dtzi Bob:
Pursuant to your January 7 correspondence and to our telephone conversation yesterday
afternoon, 1 would like to provide a written acknowledgement of the agreement regarding
the sale of assets and liabilities of MRC from GenBio for $500,000. As I mentioned, we
generally agree with your proposal.
Please note, however, that the capital amounts in Sections (B)v (C) and (D) of your proposal
only total 5450,000. In this regard, I would like to modify section (B) to be increased to
$400,000 - instead of S350,000 - to that the total will add up to the enure £500,000. .1
will plan to take this proposal to the GenBio Board of Directors within the next week, to
receive formal approval.
I will look forward to speaking with you shortly.
Sincerely yours,
VENTANA

Thomas O. Gephart
Managing Partner
TOG/kk
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